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a b s t r a c t
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) allows a semi-trusted proxy to convert a ciphertext originally
intended for a user into another ciphertext of the same message intended for another
user, and the proxy, however, cannot learn anything about the message encrypted. In
previous papers, in order to achieve the CCA2-security, a commonmethod for constructing
PRE schemes was to apply the paradigm of using strongly-unforgeable one-time signature
which transforms a selective-identity, CPA-secure identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme
into a CCA-secure cryptosystem. In this paper, we propose a direct design of the
bidirectional CCA-secure PRE scheme, which makes a direct use of the underlying IBE
structure and does not need any auxiliary signature mechanism. Our construction is
efficient and suitable for further designing multi-user PRE schemes. Its security is proved
on the base of the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption in the standard model.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Proxy re-encryption (PRE), introduced by Blaze et al. [1] in Eurocrypt’98, allows a semi-trust proxy to transform a
ciphertext originally intended for a user, Alice, into another ciphertext of the same message intended for another user, Bob.
The proxy, however, cannot learn anything about themessage encrypted. PRE turns out to be a very useful tool, and hasmany
practical applications, such as distributed file system [2,3], outsourced filtering of encrypted spam [2,3], and encrypted email
forwarding [1].
According to the direction of the transformation of the message encrypted, PRE schemes can be categorized into
bidirectional PREs and unidirectional PREs. In bidirectional PREs, the proxy can transform from the user Alice to the user
Bob and vice versa. In contrast, the proxy in a unidirectional PRE cannot transform the ciphertext in the opposite direction.
According to another criterion, PRE schemes can also be classified into multi-hop PREs in which the ciphertext can be
transformed between multiple users, for example, from Alice to Bob and then from Bob to Charlie, and into single-hop
PREs where the ciphertext can be transformed by only one hop. It is important for the design of PRE that we can easily
construct a multi-hop PRE scheme from a single-hop PRE one.
In their seminal paper [1], Blaze et al. proposed the first bidirectional PRE scheme. Seven years later, Ateniese et al. [3]
presented a unidirectional PRE scheme by using bilinear pairing. To achieve the anonymity property, Ateniese et al. [4]
proposed the first PRE with key-privacy and proved that it was secure against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) under the
decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption. All these schemes [2–4,1] were only CPA-secure.
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However, the security against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) is often required in many applications. To achieve the
CCA-security of PRE, Canetti and Hohenberger [5] applied the technique of Canetti et al. [6] with a little modification,
which transforms a selective-identity, CPA-secure IBE scheme into a CCA-secure encryption scheme. Based on the
Canetti–Hohenberger technique [5], Libert and Vergnaud [7] gave a single-hop unidirectional PRE scheme secure in the
standard model. They proved that their scheme was secure against the replayable chosen-ciphertext attack (RCCA) [8] in
the non-adaptive corruption model. Weng et al. [9] constructed a CCA-secure unidirectional proxy re-encryption in the
standardmodel. Robert et al. [10] presented two constructions of CCA-secure PRE schemes without using pairings but using
the ElGamal signature mechanism. Weng et al. [11] was an improved and full version of [10]. Along the same line, Shao and
Cao [12] proposed another proxy re-encryption scheme without using pairing. However, a chosen-ciphertext attack on it
was found in [13,14]. Wang et al. [15] constructed bidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes without pairing and random
oracles, but in their construction, they used a one-time strong unforgeable signature scheme.
To control the role of the proxy in a PRE scheme at a fine-grained level, Tang [16] and Weng et al. [17] independently
introduced a variant of PREnamed conditional proxy re-encryption (C-PRE). In such a system, the ciphertextswere generated
with respect to a certain condition, and the proxy can translate a ciphertext only if the associated condition was satisfied.
Fang et al. [18] formalized the condition on the anonymity in the security model of PRE and constructed an efficient C-PRE
scheme. Recently,Weng et al. [19] re-formalized the definition and security notions for C-PRE and presented amore efficient
C-PRE scheme. Traceable proxy re-encryption, introduced by Libert and Vergnaud [20], attempted to solve the problem of
disclosing re-encryption keys, by tracing the proxieswho had done so. Proxy re-encryption had also been studied in identity-
based scenarios, in works such as [21–25].
All PRE schemes [5,7,12,16,18] utilized the Canetti–Halevi–Katz method [6] for transforming any selective-identity,
CPA-secure identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme into a CCA-secure cryptosystem using a strongly-unforgeable one-
time signature scheme. The goal of using a strongly-unforgeable one-time signature scheme was to make a re-encrypted
ciphertext publicly verifiable. Weng et al. [17,13] essentially used a one-time Schnorr signature scheme in order to make
the scheme publicly verifiable.
1.1. Our contribution
In this paper, we begin with the Boyen–Mei–Waters (BMW) paradigm [26] to make a direct use of the underlying IBE
structure, and we do not use a strongly-unforgeable one-time signature scheme other than the IBE scheme itself. First recall
the idea of the BMW paradigm. In the BMW paradigm, the public key of a user will correspond to the public parameters of
an IBE scheme. To encrypt a message, m, the encryption algorithm first creates the first two components of the ciphertext,
which are independent of the identity; next these two components are hashed to determine a ‘‘one-time identity’’; finally
the ciphertext is completed by constructing the third component to form an encryption to the identity determined from the
previous step. That is, the identity to whomwe encrypt is actually determined by the first two components of the ciphertext
itself. In thismanner, a ‘‘well-formed’’ ciphertext is self-contained in the sense that its construction did not need any auxiliary
signature or message authentication codemechanism. In the BMWparadigm, it needs an IBE systemwith adaptive-identity
security.
Our PRE scheme is based on the Waters Scheme [27]. In order to be capable of re-encryption, our scheme proceeds with
a modification of theWaters scheme, and wemake the hashing of the part of the ciphertext does not contain the public key.
We use the bilinear pairing to check that the remaining components are formed correctly, and therefore that the ciphertext
is well-formed and publicly verifiable.
Combining the above ideas, we obtain a directly constructedmulti-user bidirectional PRE scheme, which is CCA-secure in
the standard model. Our approach is simple and the scheme is very efficient. We will prove its security under the decisional
bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some preliminaries, including bilinear pairing, the hard
problem assumptions and single-user bidirectional PRE. Section 3 presents our scheme and gives its security proof in the
standard model. Finally, Section 4 is the conclusion.
2. Preliminaries
For a prime p, let Zp denote the algebraic set {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}, and Z∗p denote Zp \ {0}. For a finite set S, x r← S means
choosing an element x from S randomly with a uniform distribution.
2.1. Bilinear pairing
Let G = ⟨g⟩ be a cyclic group generated by g . Let BSetup be an algorithm that, on input the security parameters
1k, outputs the parameters for a bilinear pairing as (p, g, h,G,GT , e), where G,GT have prime orders p ∈ Θ(2k) and
⟨g⟩ = ⟨h⟩ = G. The mapping e : G × G −→ GT is efficiently computable and satisfies both: (Bilinear) for all g ∈ G
and a, b ∈ Zp, e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab; and (Non-degenerate) if g generates G, then e(g, g) ≠ 1.
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Decisional Bilinear Diffie–Hellman (DBDH) [28]: Let BSetup(1k)→ (p, g,G = ⟨g⟩,GT , e). For all probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) adversariesA, the probability
Pr[a, b, c, d ← Zp; x0 ← e(g, g)abc; x1 ← e(g, g)d; z ← {0, 1}; z ′ ← A(g, ga, gb, gc, xz) : z = z ′] − 1/2
is a negligible function ε(k), that is, for any positive polynomial p(k) and any sufficiently large k, ε(k) < 1/p(k).
The security of our scheme depends on the following moderate assumption.
ModifiedDecisional BilinearDiffie–Hellman (MDBDH) [5]: LetBSetup(1k)→ (q, g,G = ⟨g⟩,GT , e). For all PPT adversaries
A, the following probability
Pr[a, b, c, d ← Zq; x0 ← e(g, g)ab/c; x1 ← e(g, g)d; z ← {0, 1}; z ′ ← A(g, ga, gb, gc, xz) : z = z ′] − 1/2
is a negligible function on k.
The equivalence between MDBDH and DBDH is shown in [5].
2.2. Single-use proxy re-encryption
In this subsection, we review the definition and security model for bidirectional proxy re-encryption systems.
Formally, a bidirectional PRE scheme consists of the following six algorithms [5].
GlobalSetup(1k): The global setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1k. It outputs the global parameters param.
KeyGen(1k): On input the security parameter 1k, the key generation algorithm generates the public/secret key pair (pki, ski)
for user i.
ReKeyGen(ski, skj): The re-encryption key generation algorithm takes as input two secret keys ski and skj. It outputs a
bidirectional re-encryption key rki↔j.
Encrypt(param, pk,m): The encryption algorithm takes as input the global parameters param, a public key pk and amessage
m ∈M. It outputs a ciphertext CT under pk. HereM denotes the message space.
ReEncrypt(rki↔j, CTi): The re-encryption algorithm takes as input a re-encryption key rki↔j and a ciphertext CTi under
public key pki. It outputs a ciphertext CTj under public key pkj.
Decrypt(sk, CT): The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext CT. It outputs a message m ∈ M
or the error symbol⊥.
The correctness of PRE requires that, for any m ∈ M and any couple of public/secret key pair (pki, ski), (pkj, skj), the
following two conditions should hold:
Decrypt(ski, Encrypt(param, pki,m)) = m,
Decrypt(skj, ReEncrypt(ReKeyGen(ski, skj), Encrypt(params, pki,m))) = m.
Next, we review the security notation for PRE [5]. The chosen-ciphertext security for a PRE scheme II can be defined via
the following game between an adversaryA and a challenger C.
Setup. C takes a security parameter k and runs algorithmGlobalSetup. It givesA the resulting global parameters param.
Phase 1. A adaptively issues queries q1, q2, . . . , qm, where query qi is one of the following.
• Uncorrupted key generation query ⟨i⟩: C first runs algorithm KeyGen to obtain a public/secret key pair (pki, ski),
and then sends pki toA.
• Corrupted key generation query ⟨j⟩: C first runs algorithm KeyGen to obtain a public/secret key pair (pkj, skj),
and then gives (pkj, skj) toA.
• Re-encryption key generation query ⟨pki, pkj⟩: On input (pki, pkj)byA,C first runs algorithmReKeyGen (ski, skj)
to generate a re-encryption key rki↔j. Finally, C returns rki↔j toA. Here ski and skj are secret keys with respect
to pki and pkj respectively. It is required that pki and pkj were generated beforehand by algorithm KeyGen. As
argued in [5], for bidirectional PRE schemes, we require that either both pki and pkj are corrupted, or alternately
both are uncorrupted.
• Re-encryption query ⟨pki, pkj, CTi⟩: C runs ReKeyGen to generate the re-encryption key rki↔j. Then it runs
ReEncrypt(rki↔j, CTi) to obtain the resulting ciphertext CTj, which is returned to A. It is required that pki
and pkj were generated beforehead by algorithm KeyGen.
• Decryption query ⟨pk, CT ⟩: Challenger C returns the result of Decrypt(sk, CT ) toA, where sk is the secret key
with respect to pk. It is required that pkwere generated beforehead by algorithm KeyGen.
Challenge. Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a target public key pk∗ and two equal-length plaintexts
m0,m1 ∈ M on which it wishes to be challenged. Here it is required thatA did not previously corrupt the secret
key corresponding to pk∗. Challenger C flips a random coin γ ∈ {0, 1}, and sets the challenge ciphertext to be
CT ∗ = Encrypt(params, pk∗,mγ ), which is sent toA.
Phase 2. A issues additional queries qm+1, . . . , qmax where each of the queries is one of the following.
• Uncorrupted key generation query ⟨i⟩: C responds as in Phase 1.
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• Corrupted key generation query ⟨j⟩: C responds as in Phase 1. Here it is required that pkj ≠ pk∗. Besides, ifA has
obtained a derivative (pk′, CT ′) of (pk∗, CT ∗), it is required that pkj ≠ pk′.
• Re-encryption key generation query ⟨pki, pkj⟩:C responds as in Phase 1. Here it is required that, ifA has obtained
the secret key skj with respect to pkj,A is disallowed to issue the re-encryption key generation query ⟨pki, pkj⟩.
• Re-encryption query ⟨pki, pkj, CTi⟩:C responds as in Phase 1. Here it is required that, ifA has obtained the secret
key skj with respect to pkj, then (pki, CTi) cannot be a derivative of (pk∗, CT ∗).
• Decryption query ⟨pk, CT ⟩: C responds as in Phase 1. Here it is required that, (pk, CT ) cannot be a derivative of
(pk∗, CT ∗).
Guess. Finally, A outputs a guess γ ′ ∈ {0, 1}. If γ ′ = γ and the challenge key pk∗ is not corrupted, then output 1; else
output 0.
We refer to adversaryA as an IND–PRE–CCA adversary, and we define his advantage in the attacking scheme as
AdvIND–PRE–CCAII,A = | Pr[γ ′ = γ ] − 1/2|,
where the probability is taken over the random coins consumed by the challenger and the adversary. Note that the chosen
plaintext security for a PRE scheme can be similarly defined as the above game except that the adversary is not allowed to
issue any decryption queries.
Definition 1. A PRE scheme is (t, qu, qc, qrk, qre, qd, ϵ)-IND–PRE–CCA secure, if for any t-time IND–PRE–CCA adversary
A who makes at most qu uncorrupted key generation queries, at most qc corrupted key generation queries, at most
qrk re-encryption key generation queries, at most qre re-encryption queries and at most qd decryption queries, we have
AdvIND–PRE–CCAII,A ≤ ϵ.
3. Proposed proxy re-encryption scheme
We now present our PRE scheme which is a direct construction based on the IBE scheme of Waters [27] using the BMW
technique [26]. Our scheme is CCA-secure in the standard model, and we prove its security under the decisional bilinear
Diffie–Hellman assumption.
3.1. Our scheme
Here we assume the availability of some collision-resistant function family. We may use any fixed injective encoding
H0 : GT ×G→ {0, 1}n to substitute a family of collision-resistant functions Hs : GT ×G→ {0, 1}n, in which case adequate
collision resistance may be provided with an output size of only n ≈ log2(p).
Global-setup(1k): Let a security parameter 1k, (p,G,GT , e) be the bilinear map parameters, where prime order p > 2k,
generators g, h, g1, u′, {ui}1≤i≤n be randomnumbers inG. Finally, a random seed s for the collision-resistant family
is chosen, if needed (for notational convenience, we always write Hs, and limit s = 0 whenever the injective
encoding H0 is used). The global parameters are
par := {G,GT , g, h, g1, u′, {ui}1≤i≤n}.
Keygen(1k): On input 1k, select random x ∈ Zp. Set pk = gx, sk = x.
Rekeygen(ski, skj): On input ski = x and skj = y, output the bidirectional re-encryption key rki↔j = y/xmod p.
Enc(m, pki, par): On input pki and a messagem ∈ GT , then select a random r ∈ Zp and compute
C1 = pkri , C2 = hr , C3 = e(g, g1)r ·m.
Next, a bit string w ∈ {0, 1}n is derived as w = Hs(C2, C3). Let w1, w2, . . . , wn denote the binary expansion of w,
where each bitwi ∈ {0, 1}. The final step is to compute C4 = (u′∏ni=1 uwii )r .
The complete ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3, C4) consists of the four group elements
pkri , h
r , e(g, g1)r ·m,

u′
n∏
i=1
uwii
r
.
ReEnc(rki↔j, C): On input a re-encryption key rki↔j = y/xmod p and a ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3, C4) under key pki,
re-encrypt the ciphertext to be under key pkj as the following.
1. Compute C ′1 = C rki↔j1 = g(xr)(y/x) = gyr andw = Hs(C2, C3).
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Table 1
Comparison.
Schemes CH scheme I [5] CH scheme II DWL scheme [10] Our scheme
Encrypt 1tp + 4te + 1ts 1tp + 3te + 1tme + 1ts 3te 4te + (n+ 2)tme
Re-Encrypt 4tp + 1te + 1tv 4tp + 2te + 1tv 4te 4tp + 1te
Decrypt2 5tp + 1te + 1tv 5tp + 2te + 1tv 4te 5tp+1te+(n+1)tme
Decrypt1 5tp + 1te + 1tv 5tp + 2te + 1tv 3te 5tp+1te+(n+1)tme
Assumption DBDH DBDH mCDH mDBDH
Without RO? × √ × √
Multi-hop?
√ √ × √
Without OTS? × × × √
Note: tp, te and tme represent the computational cost of a bilinear pairing, an exponentiation and a multi-exponentiation, respectively, while ts and tv
represent the computational cost of a one-time signature signing and verification, respectively.
2. If two equalities
e(h, C1) = e(C2, pki) (1)
e(h, C4) = e

C2, u′
n∏
i=1
uwii

(2)
are hold, output the new ciphertext (C ′1, C2, C3, C4); Otherwise,output⊥.
Dec(C ′, skj): On input a secret key skj and any ciphertext C ′ = (C ′1, C2, C3, C4), check Eqs. (1) and (2). If hold, output the
messagem = C3/e(C ′1, g1)1/y.
3.2. Comparison
In this subsection, we provide a comparison of our scheme with other existing bidirectional PRE schemes (see Table 1).
3.3. Security analysis
In this subsection, we prove the IND–PRE–CCA security for our scheme in the standard model.
Theorem 1. If the DBDH assumption holds in (G,GT ), and assume that H0 : GT × G −→ {0, 1}n is an efficiently computable
injection for some n. Then PRE scheme II is bidirectional CCA secure for domain GT of messages in the standard model.
Proof. Let A be any PPT adversary. Then, we show how to construct a p.p.t adversary C, with black-box access to A, that
succeeds in breaking the mDBDH assumption with probability:
Pr[C breaks mDBDH] ≥ 1/2+ Pr[A breaks II]/2+ λ,
whereAmakes q oracle queries, λ = 18(n+1)q . Let us now describe how C operates.
OnmDBDH input (g, ga, gb, gc,Q ), whereC ′s goal is to decide ifQ = e(g, g)ab/c or not,C runsA executing the following
steps.
• Setup. The hash index s is fixed to s = 0 since we have assumed a fixed injective encoding H0. To generate a key pair,
C first sets an integer, m = 4q, and chooses an integer, k, where the elements of −→x are chosen uniformly at random
between 0 and m − 1. Let X∗ denote the pair (x′,−→x ). Additionally, the simulator C chooses a random y′ ∈ Zp and an
n-length vector, −→y = (yi), where the elements of −→y are chosen at random in Zp. These values are all kept internal to
the simulator.
For a bit stringw ∈ {0, 1}n as returned by Hs, we will letW ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be the set of all i for which the i-th bitwi = 1.
For ease of analysis we define three functions. We define
F(w) = (p− km)+ x′ +
−
i∈W
xi, (3)
J(w) = y′ +
−
i∈W
yi, (4)
K(w) =

0, if x′ +
−
i∈W
xi ≡ 0 (mod m);
1, otherwise.
(5)
C assigns h = gcs, where s ∈ Zp is chosen randomly. Set g1 = ga. It then assigns the public parameters u′ = gp−km+x′gcy′
and ui = gxigcyi . Then there exist u′∏ni=1 uwii = gF(w)gcJ(w).
The global parameters are par := {G,GT , e, g, g1, h, u, {ui}1≤i≤n}.
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• Key Generation. C chooses a random xi ∈ Z∗p . If user i is uncorrupted, then C outputs pki = (gc)xi . Else, C sets
ski = xi, pki = gxi and outputs (pki, ski).• Decryption. On input (i, C) to Odec. Here C = (C1, C2, C3, C4). If Check(C, pki) = 0, then the ciphertext is not well-
formed. So, C halts and returns⊥.
Next, C proceeds as follows. Notice that in a well-formed ciphertext, C1 = pkri and C4 = (u′
∏n
i=1 u
wi
i )
r = (gF(w)gcJ(w))r
for the same value of r ∈ Zp.C determines w = Hs(C2, C3). If K(w) = 0,C aborts and randomly choose its guess β ′.
Otherwise C decrypts the ciphertext by computing
t = C4
(C1)J(w)/xi
= ((g
F(w)gcJ(w))r)
(gcxir)J(w)/xi
= gF(w)r .
We have g r = t1/F(w). Then C outputs the message C3/e(t1/F(w), g1).• Re-Encryption Key: On input (i, j) to Orkey, if one of i and j is uncorrupted and the other is corrupted, then this call
is illegal. Otherwise, C outputs the re-encryption key xj/xi.• Re-Encryption. On input (i, j, C) to Orenc, if the value Check(C, pki) = 0, then the ciphertext is not well-formed. So C
halts and returns⊥. Otherwise, C parses C = (C1, C2, C3, C4).
– If both users i and j are uncorrupted or both are corrupted, C computes the re-encryption key xj/xi and executes the
algorithm ReEnc(xj/xi, C).
– If user i is corrupted and user j is uncorrupted, then C computes C
xj/s
2 = (hr)xj/s = (gcsr)xj/s = (gcxj)r = pkrj = C ′1
(where C1 = pkri ) and outputs (C ′1, C2, C3, C4).
– If user i is uncorrupted and user j is corrupted, C solves for g r as it does in decryption (where C1 = pkri ), computes
g rxj = pkrj = C ′1 and outputs (C ′1, C2, C3, C4).• Challenge. At some point, A outputs a challenge (i∗,m0,m1), where i∗ is the index of an honest user. C responds
choosing a random γ ∈ {0, 1} and setting:
C∗1 = (gb)xi∗ = (gcxi∗ )b/c = pkb/ci∗
C∗2 = (gb)s = hb/c, C∗3 = Q ·mγ
we computew∗ = Hs(C∗2 , C∗3 ). If x′+
∑
i∈W∗ xi ≠ km, the simulator aborts and submits a random guess forC. Otherwise,
we have F(w∗) = 0 mod p and the simulator computes the fourth ciphertext element:
C∗4 = (gb)J(w
∗) = (gcJ(w∗))b/c .
It outputs the challenge ciphertext C∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 ).
We note that C∗ is a valid encryption ofmγ if the simulator was given a BDH tuple. Otherwise, C∗ is independent of γ in
the adversary’s view.
• Decision. Finally,A will output a guess γ ′ ∈ {0, 1}. If γ = γ ′, then C outputs 1 (i.e., mDBDH instance), otherwise C
outputs 0 (i.e., not an mDBDH instance).
Referred to [26], if (
q
i=1 K(wi) = 1∧x′+
∑
i∈W∗ xi = km) is hold, the challenger can succeed in proceeding to decryption
oracle and challenge. Then we have
Pr[C breaks mDBDH] ≥ 1/2+ Pr[A breaks II]/2+ λ. 
4. Conclusion
By using a technique of Boyen–Mei–Waters, we propose a directly constructed multi-user bidirectional PRE scheme,
which is CCA-secure in the standard model. Our approach is simple and the scheme constructed is efficient because our
scheme does not use strongly-unforgeable one-time signature scheme. We prove it is secure under the decisional bilinear
Diffie–Hellman assumption. The drawback of our scheme is that the public key is too long (made of about 160 elements of
G as in [27]).
This work motivates some interesting open problems. One problem is how to construct a key-private CCA-secure
PRE scheme without random oracles. Another is how to construct a CCA-secure PRE scheme without too many security
parameters in the direct method.
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